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“The Key is in Our Hands:” Soviet Energy Strategy 
during Détente and the Global Oil Crises  
of the 1970s 
Jeronim Perović & Dunja Krempin ∗ 
Abstract: »‚Der Schlüssel liegt in unseren Händen‘. Die sowjetische Energiestra-
tegie während der Détente und der globalen Ölkrisen der 1970er Jahre«. This 
essay traces the rise of the Soviet Union as Europe’s key energy supplier during 
the 1970s and early 1980s. While détente and the global energy crises proved 
to be accelerating factors in fostering East-West economic cooperation, it was 
ultimately the USSR’s own impeding “energy crisis” that prompted Soviet lead-
ers to seek closer relations with the West. If the Soviet Union wanted to meet 
the growing energy demand at home, maintain export volumes to its Com-
munist allies in Eastern Europe, and boost its role as an international energy 
player, it needed to counter fast-declining production and engage in the devel-
opment of new energy frontiers, namely in the resource-rich northern part of 
Western Siberia. Concerns over the threat of superpower confrontation were 
major motivations for the Soviet leadership to embark on the path of détente 
beginning in the late 1960s. However, as this essay argues, rapprochement with 
the West was also driven and sustained by an understanding on the part of the 
Moscow leadership that it needed Western technological assistance and credits. 
Keywords: Soviet Union, East-West cooperation, energy crisis, oil, gas, détente, 
Cold War, Western Siberia. 
 
Take the European part, the oil and gas of Siberia. This is a  
major issue. This will change our very being. These are major  
economic indicators. They will change our possibilities, our  
relationship with all of Europe – and not only with the  
Socialist countries, where we are able to ship gas and oil,  
but with France, the FRG, Italy. The key is in our hands.  
Gas hither – hard currency thither. This is a big economic  
and political question.  
Leonid Brezhnev, February 5, 19711 
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1  Quote from Leonid Brezhnev during an internal party discussion on the preparation of the 
report of the TsK KPSS to the 25th session of the KPSS, February 5, 1971. In General’nyi 
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1.  Introduction 
When, on October 17, 1973, Arab oil states retaliated against US arms ship-
ments to Israel during the Yom Kippur War by announcing a cut in production 
and, a few days later, an embargo of oil shipments to the United States, as well 
as to the Netherlands and Portugal – which were assisting the US airlift –the 
effect was imminent. By January 1974, the price per barrel of crude oil had 
nearly quadrupled to $12, and a number of Western European states experienced 
shortages. The price increase exacerbated inflation, while cuts and embargos 
threatened to disrupt industrial and agricultural production. The crisis eventually 
eased by the spring of 1974 when Israel pulled its forces back from the Sinai and 
the Arab states lifted their sanctions, but the era of cheap oil was over.  
The Soviet Union, the country with the world’s largest known reserves of 
fossil fuels and a net exporter of energy to Europe, was seemingly unaffected 
by the crisis. Soviet Premier Minister Aleksei Kosygin noted in a public speech 
in Moscow on June 12, 1974, that “[s]uch upheavals [as observed in the West] 
are not a feature of our Socialist planned economy.”2 If there were any doubts, 
Kosygin sought to erase these by delivering the respective figures: the Soviet 
Union had managed to raise its annual oil production from 31 million tons in 
1940 to 450 million in 1974, and it had also increased the production of natural 
gas from a meager 3.3 billion cubic meters to a staggering 256 billion during 
the same period,3 making the Soviet Union second only to the United States in 
terms of overall oil and gas production. In fact, according to Kosygin, the Sovi-
et Union was performing outstandingly, as the oil and gas production targets 
set by the 24th Party Congress for Western Siberia, the Soviet Union’s new 
energy frontier, had been “overfulfilled.”4  
Kosygin knew fully well that the picture he presented was tainted. During 
1973/74, the Soviet Union was not suffering from an acute oil shortage. But it 
was facing an energy problem of its own. In light of its export obligations 
towards Western and Eastern Europe and rapidly growing domestic energy 
demand, the country needed to counter declining production in its old produc-
ing areas, such as the Volga-Ural, and develop new regions. However, since the 
largest known reserves were located in remote and difficult-to-access parts of 
Siberia, production and transportation were technologically challenging and 
                                                                                                                                
sekretar’ L. I. Brezhnev 1964-1982: spetsial’noe izdanie 2006, 103. Moscow: Vestnik Arkhiva 
Prezidenta.  
2  Kosygin Address, Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-74-115, June 13, 1974. 
3  Other sources present the following numbers: 31.1 million tons of oil and 3.22 billion m3 in 
1940: Dienes and Shabad 1979, 46, 70. 458.8 million tons of oil and 260.6 billion m3 of gas 
in 1974: Stern 1980, 7. 
4  Kosygin Address. 
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extremely costly – thus, in the short-term, Siberian energy was simply not 
feasible to develop without Western technology and credits.  
Security concerns over the threat of nuclear war between the superpowers 
were major motivations for the Soviet leadership to engage on the path of dé-
tente beginning in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, as this essay argues, rap-
prochement with the West was also driven and sustained by an understanding 
on the part of the Moscow leadership that the Soviet Union needed Western 
assistance in order to emerge from its own crisis. Détente presented the Soviet 
Union with a unique opportunity to develop Siberian energy – and most nota-
bly natural gas – which seemed the most promising area of cooperation in the 
evolving East-West economic relationship.  
Drawing on positive experience from earlier economic cooperation projects 
with Western European energy companies which had begun in the late 1960s, 
the Soviet Union, under the leadership of First Party Secretary Leonid Brezh-
nev, had high hopes to realize similar projects in the early 1970s, only on a 
much larger scale and by targeting US and Japanese companies specifically. 
However, with the deterioration of détente and the US Congress refusing to 
ease restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, joint cooperation efforts with 
the United States and Japan regarding Siberian gas collapsed by the mid-1970s. 
It was only after this point that the Soviet leadership decided to begin a massive 
new program for the development of Western Siberian energy on its own. 
While Soviet-European economic and energy cooperation had gradually ex-
panded over the years, it was only towards the end of the 1970s that Moscow 
shifted its attention again more firmly to the West Europeans – and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in particular – as key partners in the endeavor to develop 
Siberian gas.  
Nonetheless, it would take another major increase in oil prices, triggered by 
the shortage of Iranian oil on the global markets after the revolution of 1979, to 
provide the impetus to revive those large gas projects that had been discussed 
with Western governments and companies in the early 1970s. After intense 
negotiations, in 1981 the USSR and representatives from Western European 
energy companies and banks agreed in principle on building a major export 
pipeline transporting Siberian energy directly from the gas fields in Tiumen’ to 
Europe, thus paving the way for the East-West energy interdependence that 
determines relations between Russia and Europe to this day.  
In the general histories written on the energy crises of the 1970s, the Soviet 
Union is largely left out.5 In Daniel Yergin’s book The Prize, for example, the 
Soviet Union appears during the energy crisis of the 1973/74 only as a player in 
                                                             
5  The two important exceptions within Western historiography are Högselius 2013 and Gus-
tafson 1989. These studies provide excellent in-depth analyses of Soviet energy policy with 
relation to gas and gas trade; neither addresses the relation between the global oil shocks of 
1973/74 and 1979 for Soviet energy policy explicitly, however.  
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the larger Cold War setting, not in terms of an energy power in its own right.6 
This is to some extent understandable, as it was not until the end of the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s that the Soviet Union started to emerge as a key 
European energy player. However, energy considerations played a large role in 
the Soviet Union’s foreign and economic policies, and it was precisely during 
the 1970s that the foundations were laid for the Soviet Union’s rise as an inter-
national energy power. In this respect, neither the oil shock of 1973/74, nor the 
energy crisis following the Iranian crisis in 1979 marked the beginning of East-
West energy relations; yet both events proved to be accelerating factors in 
establishing these relationships.  
2.  The Nature of the Soviet “Energy Crisis” 
There was a great deal of discussion about the nature and extent of the Soviet 
Union’s energy crisis in the West. Imperial Russia had been a major oil export-
er to Europe since the late nineteenth century and, after the Russian Revolution 
of 1917, the Bolsheviks continued this tradition. The role of the Soviet Union 
as an oil supplier to Europe declined due to the Soviet Union’s failure in the 
1930s to develop new energy production centers outside the Caucasus, a region 
that, on the eve of World War II, was still responsible for some 90 percent of 
all Soviet oil production.7 After the German attack on the Soviet Union in 
1941, the country suffered from a severe fuel shortage due to the devastations 
of war and declining production rates in the Caucasian oil fields. The Soviet 
Union only reemerged as an oil supplier to Europe in the 1950s, when produc-
tion took off in the newly developed fields of the Volga-Ural. While, in 1953, 
the USSR exported some 4.2 million tons of oil, by 1968 the volume had in-
creased to 86.2 million tons,8 half of which was exported to its allies in the 
Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the other half to Western Europe. In the 
West, the largest quantities of Soviet oil were absorbed by Italy, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and France. These exports presented an important source 
of much-needed hard-currency income to the USSR. The USSR also shipped 
small amounts of oil to Third World countries in exchange for goods, and as a 
means to gain political goodwill.9 
Although the share of “red oil” in European oil consumption was fairly 
modest, this did not prevent Washington from convincing its NATO allies, in 
                                                             
6  Yergin 1991, 570-94.  
7  The most important oil production sites in the Caucasus were located near the cities of 
Baku, Groznyi, and Maikop. On Soviet oil policy during from the late 1920s to the 1940s: 
Igolkin 2005. 
8  Goldman 1980, 22-3. 
9  For an overview, see: Goldman 2010, 1-54; Perović 2013, 5-28. 
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reaction to the crises over Berlin and Cuba, to impose an embargo on the ex-
port of steel pipes to the USSR in November 1962. Already before, the NATO 
Council had advised the Europeans to “exercise caution and restraint in deter-
mining the level of their oil imports from the Soviet bloc.”10 Not only did the 
Western sanctions regime do little to prevent the Soviets from finishing the 
“Friendship” (druzhba) oil pipeline by 1964, but also Soviet oil hardly present-
ed a threat to the Europeans. In 1966, Soviet oil only accounted for about 7.5 
percent of West Germany’s oil imports. Only in the case of Italy, the largest 
buyer of Soviet oil in terms of absolute volume, did the share of Soviet oil 
reach some 20 percent.11 Overall, around 80 percent of oil imported by Western 
Europe in 1970 originated in the Middle East, while the share of oil from the 
USSR and other Eastern European Socialist states was around seven percent.12 
Only a few smaller Western European states, notably Finland and Iceland, 
imported the largest share of their oil from the Socialist bloc. At this time, gas 
was not a major issue. The USSR had begun to ship gas in ever-larger quanti-
ties to its allies in Eastern Europe starting in the early 1960s.13 However, it was 
only in 1968 that Austria, the first Western European country to sign a “gas for 
technology” deal with the Soviet Union, received small quantities of Soviet gas 
through an extension of the East European pipeline transportation system. It 
would be several more years before West Germany, Italy, and France would 
begin to import modest quantities of this commodity.14  
When NATO lifted its embargo in November 1966, discussions in the West 
no longer centered on the alleged Soviet “oil threat.” By this time, Western 
observers were beginning to doubt whether the USSR would be able to main-
tain current export volumes, let alone increase these substantially in the years 
to come. A US National Intelligence Estimate report of November 1970 saw 
                                                             
10  NATO report quoted in Oil Resources in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus: British Docu-
ments 1885-1978, vol. 8, ed. A. L. P. Burdett, 283. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
11  Interdepartmental Working Paper on the Security of Oil Supplies, British Ministry of Power, 
January 23, 1968, in Ibid., 52-9, 59. 
12  Telegram from the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State, The Hague, 
October 20, 1970. In Foreign Relations of the United States (=FRUS), 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, 
Energy Crisis, 1969-1974, 134-5, 134. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Office. 
13  During the 1970s the burden of energy exports to the Eastern allies became even stronger. 
The oil consumption in the CMEA almost doubled from 53.2 tons in 1970 to its maximum in 
1979 of 102.7 tons per year, while the share of Soviet oil imports rose from 76.1 percent in 
1970 to a maximum of 77.7 percent in 1976 and then fell to about 75 percent in the fol-
lowing years. The consumption of gas more than doubled from 38.9 m3 in 1970 to 80.1 m3 
in 1979 and continued to rise up to 104.0 m3 in 1987, while the share of Soviet gas imports 
rose from 6.7 percent in 1097 to 39.4 percent in 1987. Figures from Bethkenhagen 1990, 
242. 
14  West Germany received its first gas deliveries in 1973, Italy in 1974, and France in 1976: 
Stern 1983, 373. 
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the USSR as being self-sufficient in oil “at least through 1975 and probably 
through 1980,” but predicted that the “level of Soviet exports both to Eastern 
Europe and to non-Communist countries will depend to a growing degree, 
however, on Soviet ability to procure supplemental supplies of oil from the 
Middle East for re-export.”15 The authors of the report argued that this was due 
to the fact that “Soviet oil fields are being depleted more rapidly than expected, 
in part because poor extractive practices have made large quantities of reserves 
impossible to recover.” The report acknowledged that more Soviet oil was 
coming from recently discovered deposits in Central Asia and Western Siberia, 
yet since these were “far from centers of consumption in the western part of the 
USSR” and due to the “[e]xtremes of climate, difficult terrain, reluctance of 
skilled specialists to work under such conditions, and shortage of suitable tech-
nology and equipment,” the exploitation of these reserves was “difficult, costly, 
and the rate of increase in total production of oil is slowing down.”16  
Western observers saw strong indications of the Soviet Union’s energy 
problems during 1973, when the Soviet Union repeatedly fell behind schedule 
in its oil delivery commitments to Western European countries, such as France, 
Italy, and West Germany.17 When the oil shock hit Europe in 1973/74, analysts 
in the West saw their gloomy forecast of Soviet oil confirmed, as the Soviet 
Union was not able to ship more oil abroad at short notice.18 A British internal 
government paper observed in February 1974 that the oil crisis led not only to 
“extensive rethinking of energy policies in the developed Western countries,” 
but also to an “embarrassment to the Soviet Union,” which “despite the expan-
sion of its oil industry over the past decade” proved unable “to become a sub-
stantial contributor to world supplies.”19 
These doubts were not unfounded. Between 1960 and 1970, Soviet oil pro-
duction had more than doubled, from some 150 million tons per year to over 
300 million tons, and would continue to rise until the early 1980s, when Soviet 
oil production reached its peak, producing some 600 million tons of oil per 
year.20 Yet, with the continuing expansion of energy-intensive industries 
(namely the armament sector) and the start of mass production of consumers 
                                                             
15  “National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 20/30-70,” Washington, DC, November 14. 1970. In 
FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis 1969-1974, 136-51, 143. 
16  Ibid., 143-4. 
17  See reports from the British Embassy in Bonn (dated December 19, 1973) and Moscow 
(dated January 8, 1974) on Soviet Oil Supplies to East and West Europe. In Oil Resources in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 427, 432-5. 
18  Cf. the letter of German Chancellor Willy Brandt to Leonid Brezhnev, November 7, 1973. 
2004. In Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (= AAPD), vol. III: 
October 1-December 31, 1973, 1780-81. Munich: Oldenbourg; Sowjet-Union: Hinter den 
Kulissen. 1973. Der Spiegel 50 (December 10): 96-7.  
19  The report dated February 1974 is titled “Soviet Oil Production Problems” and contained in 
Oil Resources in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 445-50, 445. 
20  Gaidar 2006, 101 (based on Soviet statistics from various years).  
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goods such as cars, which absorbed an ever growing share of oil,21 the Soviet 
hunger for hydrocarbons rose faster than oil production, meaning that virtually 
all of the additional oil the Soviet Union produced between 1974 and 1978 was 
needed to satisfy the demands of an extremely wasteful domestic industry.22 In 
order to free more oil for export to the lucrative Western market, the Soviet 
Union had to either introduce measures to use existing energy more efficiently 
or boost energy production. Ultimately, the Soviets decided not to save, but to 
expand their energy base by turning their attention to West Siberia and to natu-
ral gas.  
3.  Fighting the Cold 
Even though, by the early 1970s, Soviet geologists had by and large confirmed 
the existence of huge reserves of oil, and even more reserves of natural gas, in 
Western Siberia. However, the Soviet leadership was hesitant to take the great 
leap into the inaccessible parts of this remote area (at this time, Siberian fossil 
resources, mainly oil, had been developed only in the more accessible and 
moderate zones of the region). The prospect of developing energy in Western 
Siberia was thus a nightmare for Soviet planners from the very beginning. 
Building infrastructure in the vast and unsettled swamplands, with permafrost 
soil and temperatures dropping as low as -50⁰C during wintertime, not only 
presented huge challenges in terms of technology, but also required massive 
financial investment and tens of thousands of people willing to work under 
extreme conditions. Given these difficulties, the Siberian enterprise was, from 
an economic standpoint, highly questionable and thus met with considerable 
internal political opposition.  
The idea of using Siberia’s natural resource potential was not new. When 
Russia started its conquest of the region in the sixteenth century, Siberia was 
colonized and exploited for mainly economic purposes – namely, fur and pre-
cious metals. Otherwise, it was known as a place for exiles, prisoners, and 
adventurers. In the minds of the Russian public, it presented a “kingdom of 
death” and “eternal silence” as the writer and ethnographer Ippolit Iri-
narkhovich Zavalishin noted in his account of a journey to Western Siberia in 
the mid-nineteenth century.23 It was not until the Bolshevik revolution that 
Siberia was assigned a firm place in the Soviet Union’s ambitious industrializa-
                                                             
21  In 1966 the government announced that car production would quadruple during the 8th 
Five Year Plan. In 1975, 1.2 million cars were produced in the Soviet Union, six times as 
many as in 1965: Siegelbaum 2008, 238. 
22  On the problems of Soviet economic development during the 1970s in general: Nove 1982, 
17-44, especially 17-25.  
23  Zavalishin 1862, 273. 
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tion program. In line with Lenin’s credo of 1920 that “Communism equals 
Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country,”24 the focus of Soviet 
energy policy was on the construction of gigantic hydroelectric power stations 
along some of Siberia’s vast rivers. From these power stations, electricity was 
transported southwards to the populated parts of the Soviet Union.25  
Some Soviet geologists had speculated since the late 1920s that the remote 
parts of Siberia held large deposits of oil, gas, and other valuable resources, yet 
the country’s leadership did not give permission to send expeditions in order to 
exploit the area systematically. It was only when the Stalinist regime began 
fully to appreciate the huge relevance of oil to modern warfare and industriali-
zation during World War II that it understood that it urgently needed to look for 
new producing regions.26 Thus, it was at this point that Siberia came back into 
focus. Though the existence of oil and gas deposits in the Tiumen’ region was 
confirmed in the 1950s, it was not until a decade later that the Soviet leadership 
finally granted permission to exploit the vast northern parts as well. The re-
spective governmental decisions “On Measures to Intensify the Geological 
Exploration of Oil and Gas in Western Siberia” (1963) and “On the Organiza-
tion of Preliminary Preparations for the Industrial Exploitation of Located Oil 
and Gas Deposits” (1964) initiated the industrial development of the region, to 
be followed by around a dozen governmental decrees over the next few years.27  
Rising production rates could not, however, mask the concurrent economic 
and social problems facing Soviet planners in Western Siberia.28 The biggest 
challenge was to find qualified personnel ready to work in the harsh Siberian 
conditions. Although the party leadership engaged thousands of members of the 
Communist youth organization Komsomol29 and also forced a considerable num-
ber of prisoners to work in Western Siberia,30 there was a serious lack of a spe-
                                                             
24  Lenin’s quote of November 21, 1920 can be found in: W. I. Lenin. 1966. Werke, vol. 31, 414. 
Berlin: Dietz-Verlag. 
25  Gestwa 2010, 14-26. 
26  Perović 2013, 6-11.  
27  Koleva 2007, 96. 
28  On production rates: Slavkina 2002, 69. 
29  Cf. Andrei Kortunov’s speech at the 12th conference of the Tiumen’ Regional Komsomol 
Organization in January 1966. In Neft’ i gaz Tiumeni v dokumentakh, vol. 2: 1966-1970, ed. 
D. A. Smorodinskov and V. N. Klepnikov, 20-1. Sverdlovsk: Sredne-Uralskoe knizhnoe izda-
tel’stvo. (1973). 
30  It is not clear to what extent the Soviet Union used prisoners for oil and gas exploration 
work and the building of pipelines in the 1960s and 1970s. The German news magazine Der 
Spiegel in August 1982 referred to 100,000 prisoners and an unspecified number of workers 
from the German Democratic Republic: Dreckige Lüge. 1982. Der Spiegel 33 (August 16): 
94-6, 94. See also the report by the CIA on the use of prisoners for pipeline construction in 
the early 1980s: Central Intelligence Agency. 1982. Alleged Use of Forced Labor on Siberian 
Pipeline, memorandum for Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State, August 20. Washing-
ton, DC: Central Intelligence Agency <http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/ 
document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000102966.pdf> (accessed September 29, 2013).  
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cialized work force. Already in 1967, the Tiumen’ Regional Party Committee 
complained about this situation in a decree addressed to Viktor Muravlenko, the 
first head of Glavtiumenneftegaz, the region’s main oil and gas department.31 The 
party committee suggested that in order to make the region more attractive to 
highly educated specialists, they were to be paid higher wages.32 Student groups 
were to be engaged to assist in the building of infrastructures, including schools, 
apartment buildings, and parts of the railway, which were to be finished on the 
occasion of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution in 1967.33 Although 
some of these demands were implemented later (workers in Western Siberia got 
markedly higher salaries than those in other parts of the country, and enjoyed 
various other benefits), the topic of manpower remained a problem and continued 
to be discussed at various scientific and party conferences.34  
Another key issue was technology. The Soviet planners were well aware of 
the fact that their “energy problem” was very different from the one Europe 
was facing. At least from the mid-1960s onwards, when additional large depos-
its of oil and gas were discovered in the northern part of the Tiumen’ region, 
the question was never whether there was enough energy in the ground, but 
how to exploit and transport these resources to the far away industrialized 
zones in the Western part of the country. The transportation issue was all the 
more challenging as the Soviet industry was not able to produce sufficient 
high-quality steel pipes and the technical equipment needed for constructing a 
vast energy infrastructure, as Soviet Deputy Minister of Gas Yuri Bokserman 
noted in 1967.35 It was precisely for this reason that Soviet representatives from 
the oil and gas sector travelled abroad in order to gain knowledge and build up 
contacts with specialists in the West and frequently took part in international 
energy meetings.36  
Certainly, a lack of manpower and technical equipment, combined with the 
problem of insufficient financial means, constituted severe obstacles in the 
development of Western Siberian energy resources. Still, when investigating 
the issue, one cannot fail to notice the gap between the large numbers of gov-
ernmental decrees repeatedly ordering the exploitation of the region and the 
slow progress on the ground during most of the 1960s and well into the mid-
1970s. Thus, apart from the obvious obstacles, another factor slowing devel-
                                                             
31  Decree by the Tiumen’ Regional Party Committee “On the work with leading and technical 
cadres on enterprises of the oil industry,” January. 1967. In Neft’ i gaz Tiumeni v dokumen-
takh, 78-9. 
32  Decree on Glavtiumen’neftegazstroi, February 1967, in Ibid., 88. 
33  Cf. “Socialist duties of the workers […] for 1967,” and letter from the Tiumen’ Regional Party 
Committee about the work of the student working groups, October 1967, in Ibid., 83-4, 114. 
34  Cf. “Decree on the conference on problems of development and placement of workforce,” 
January 1969, in Ibid., 180-87. 
35  Högselius 2013, 137. 
36  Scientists started to travel abroad already in the 1950s: Ibid., 26-7. 
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opment was internal party opposition and in-fighting among the numerous 
ministries and branches of central and local bureaucracy, all of which were 
competing for scarce investment resources. In order to streamline the decision-
making process and avoid the “bazaar” of the various ministries fighting over 
the allocation of resources ahead of each five-year planning process,37 First 
Party Secretary Brezhnev already in the mid-1960s sought to strengthen GOS-
PLAN, the committee responsible for economic planning, and thereby also its 
head, Nikolai Baibakov, who had made a name for himself as minister of the 
oil industry under Stalin.38  
Bureaucracy was, in Brezhnev’s mind, the biggest foe of development. In a 
public appearance before representatives of local state and party committees 
and enterprises in 1965, Brezhnev complained that in order to realize big ideas, 
any five-year planning needed to determine where to concentrate investment: 
“If we give each 20 kopeks, no idea can be realized.”39 At this time, however, 
the Soviet party leader did not yet favor the development of Western Siberia, 
which was also in line with the thinking of Nikolai Baibakov, who was to be-
come one of Brezhnev’s key advisors on economic issues. Baibakov was ini-
tially skeptical. He did not believe the “overtly positive sounding indicators” 
that the famous Soviet geologist, Farman Salmanov, presented to him during a 
meeting with members of the local party of the Tiumen’ region in the mid-
1960s. Also, given the lack of technology and the problem of finding enough 
manpower, Baibakov doubted whether it would be feasible, let alone economi-
cally sustainable, to develop Siberia.40 Instead, he believed that it would be 
sufficient to further increase oil and gas production in the existing oil regions in 
the Volga-Ural, the Caucasus, and the newly developed fields of the more 
accessible parts of Siberia. Also, during the second half of the 1960s, Baibakov 
concluded gas and oil import deals with Iran and Afghanistan in order to sup-
ply the adjacent Caucasus and Central Asia regions with energy in exchange 
for Soviet technical equipment and investment.41 
It was only in the late 1960s that the Soviet leadership started to pay more 
attention to the development of Western Siberia. The change of mind was due 
to the increasing evidence that the middle and northern parts of the Tiumen’ 
region indeed held vast oil and even bigger gas reserves. Also, with the easing 
of East-West tensions and positive first experiences resulting from commercial 
deals with Western European companies, international technical cooperation on 
a large scale now seemed a real option. In order to bring about cooperation 
with the West, however, a major shift in Soviet foreign policy was needed. 
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4.  Détente and Energy: The Enthusiasm of the Early Years 
Brezhnev was genuinely afraid of another major war. He had personally expe-
rienced the devastating consequences that World War II had brought to the 
Soviet Union and Europe, and had witnessed Khrushchev’s dangerous brink-
manship in the early 1960s over Berlin and Cuba, which almost caused a nu-
clear confrontation with the West. However, it was one thing to strive for 
“peaceful coexistence,” as Khrushchev had propagated, and another matter 
entirely to engage with one’s ideological adversary in mutual trade and long-
term economic cooperation projects. In the sensitive field of energy, it was not 
only the sellout of the country’s wealth to the Capitalists that provoked sharp 
criticism in the ranks of the CPSU, but a more general uneasiness about the 
ideological foundations upon which Soviet power rested. Contrary to what 
“scientific Communism” taught, some argued, by concluding long-term eco-
nomic agreements with Western states in the field of energy, the Soviet Union 
was in fact helping Capitalism to emerge from its crisis, thus postponing So-
cialist revolution to a remote future.42  
Brezhnev was not greatly preoccupied with the need to justify détente in 
ideological terms. Lasting peace, he maintained, was essential to prevent the 
possibility of war, and this peace could be achieved only through mutually 
advantageous economic cooperation. Close relations between the USSR and 
the West were all the more urgent as Brezhnev now saw China as the main 
threat to the Soviet Union and worried over Chinese expansionist intensions with 
regard to the Far East and Siberia.43 According to Brezhnev, détente was not 
historically unprecedented, but was in fact a continuation of Lenin’s concession 
policy of the 1920s, when the Soviet government had allowed Western compa-
nies access to the Soviet market in return for investment and technology.44 Most 
importantly – and this was a point that he carefully withheld from the public – 
Brezhnev, or rather his closest advisors, knew that the Soviet Union simply had 
no choice. The Soviet Union had longstanding experience in oil and gas produc-
tion, but not in the kind of harsh environment that prevailed in Siberia.  
The Soviet Union was willing to enter into business with the West, and the 
most attractive area of cooperation was, from Moscow’s perspective, the de-
velopment of Siberian gas. In fact, in the years to follow, Soviet representatives 
conveyed very much the same message to all parties interested, be they the 
Americans, the Germans, the Japanese, the French, or the Canadians: Siberia 
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was up for grabs, and everybody could take whatever they wanted, only if they 
provided the necessary equipment and paid for it. This was illustrated in an 
episode in January 1971, when a high-ranking German business delegation led 
by Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president of the German Industry and Trade 
Organization, returned from a business trip beyond the Urals, and Kosygin 
allegedly greeted him by saying: “You saw Siberia and the enormous possibili-
ties – help yourself!”45  
Not everyone subscribed to this point of view. The prospect that the Soviet 
Union, a truly global power that never before in its history had such military 
might and international political impact, was to become dependent on foreign-
ers for inputs and markets was regarded with considerable distaste by many 
within the USSR.46 When, in April 1972, the Soviet Politburo discussed US 
President Richard Nixon’s upcoming visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Head of 
State Nikolai Podgornyi feared that with regard to deals on gas and oil pipe-
lines, it would appear as if the Soviet Union was “planning to sell off the whole 
of Siberia; plus, it makes us look technologically helpless.”47  
According to Brezhnev and his group of advisors, however, the Soviet Un-
ion could simply not afford to isolate its economy from the international mar-
ket. An expansion of trade served both the purpose of generating foreign cur-
rency and as a means to attract Western technology and investment needed in 
those areas of the economy where the Soviets lagged considerably behind 
developments in the West. Thus, during the Politburo meeting of April 1972, 
GOSPLAN leader Baibakov countered Podgornyi’s argument on the grounds 
that although “[t]echnologically we could lay down the pipeline ourselves,” the 
Soviet Union simply had “no metal for pipes, nor for machines or other equip-
ment” and the whole process of developing difficult fields would take “at least 
30 years.”48  
Although Baibakov had, until recently, been opposed to engaging in a gas 
developing program for Western Siberia and the building of large export pipe-
lines,49 he was now one of the most ardent advocates of such a program and in 
favor of economic cooperation with the West, together with like-minded peo-
ple, including Prime Minister Kosygin, Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai 
Patolichev, or Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. What the Soviet leadership 
would definitely not publicly communicate was that a major part of the ra-
tionale for seeking cooperation with the West on energy was the Soviet Un-
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ion’s desperate need for hard currency, if only to be able to pay for the grain it 
had to regularly acquire from the United States or Canada in order to compen-
sate for the devastating effects of bad harvests and agricultural mismanage-
ment.50 The only valuable goods the country could offer, and which the West 
was genuinely interested in, were oil and gas, as Baibakov bluntly told the 
members of the Politburo meeting in April 1972.51 Trade in these commodities 
seemed all the more lucrative as oil prices began to surge from the early 1970s 
onwards, and Soviet export revenues had increased commensurately.52 
The model of cooperation was to be based on the barter/cash agreements 
with Western European companies established in previous years, namely the 
“pipe for gas” deal concluded with West Germany in February 1970 in the 
framework of Bonn’s Ostpolitik. Under the terms of this trade deal, German 
steel manufacturers delivered the pipelines necessary to transport natural gas 
from Siberia to Central Russia, and the Soviet Union agreed to pay in kind with 
natural gas deliveries. The USSR was committing itself to ship gas for at least 
20 years, and the whole endeavor was secured by a credit in the range of DM 
1.2 billion provided by a German bank consortium. Once the credit had been 
paid off with earnings from natural gas exports, the Germans would have to 
start paying in foreign currency.53  
The form of cooperation was to follow previous experience, but the plans 
the Soviets set out to discuss with their Western partners during 1972/73 were 
much more ambitious. The two largest energy projects considered at the time 
both regarded Siberian natural gas. The so-called “North Star” project was to 
build a gas pipeline from the recently discovered Urengoi fields in the Tiumen’ 
region to a gas liquefying plant near Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. From 
there, gas was to be shipped to the US East Coast.54 The other was to construct 
a gas pipeline from fields in Yakutia in Eastern Siberia, to Yakutsk, on to 
Magadan on the Pacific, and from there in liquefied form to Japan and the US 
West Coast.55 In both cases, Western companies would provide all of the 
equipment for the construction of pipelines, power stations, and LNG plants 
and grant the credits, which the Soviet Union would pay off through gas deliv-
eries over several years.56  
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Unlike under the Soviet-German agreement, Siberian gas was thus not to be 
shipped first to the European part of Russia and fed into the Soviet pipeline 
system, but would be transported directly from the Tiumen’ fields in Western 
Siberia to the West. Also, the deal with the Americans to develop Siberian 
natural gas was in the range of $4-5 billion US and, thus, no “small potatoes,” 
as US Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans explained to Nixon in mid-
November 1971.57 The volume of deliveries was to be in the range of 25 billion 
cubic meters of gas per year58 and thus about ten times larger than the volumes 
agreed upon with the Germans in 1970.59 
Given the problems the Soviet economy was facing at the time, it was clear 
that the USSR needed cooperation with the West more than vice versa. Never-
theless, Moscow was careful not to appear desperate. Thus, at one point during 
the US-Soviet Moscow Summit talks in May 1972, Kosygin pretended that the 
USSR could easily do without the United States, as it had already concluded 
such large deals with the West Europeans and all of the Socialist states and thus 
it had “almost more potential consumers” of gas than it needed.60 When ad-
dressing the West Europeans, however, the Soviets changed tactics and talked 
about the deals with the United States as if they were a fait accompli. Thus 
Brezhnev, clearly as a way to play both sides, boasted to German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt during his first official visit to Germany in May 1973 that he had 
offered the Americans “one trillion cubic meters” of gas; if the Unites States 
imported “250 to 300 billion cubic meters annually, this would last for 40 to 50 
years,” thus clearly urging the Europeans to explore similar options as quickly 
as possible, if they did not want to miss out on Siberian energy.61  
Western government and business circles were generally interested in ex-
ploring new business options with the USSR, but far less enthusiastic. Apart 
from fundamental questions regarding the economic merits of such large pro-
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jects,62 the US administration in particular initially feared that this could result 
in a loss of political leverage. When Nixon discussed the natural gas project 
with his advisors in November 1971 for the first time, he was noticeably hesi-
tant, as he understood that trade was “infinitely more important” to the Soviet 
Union than it was for the US, and he was reluctant to easily give away what he 
saw as a “bargaining position.”63 US Secretary of State William Rogers even 
saw trade as “something of a weapon” that the US could wield vis-à-vis the 
USSR.64 For the Europeans, the challenge was that the projects the Soviets had 
in mind were simply too big and thus too risky for one party to sustain alone, as 
these ventures required large financial sums. Moreover, any engagement on this 
scale required political backing. In the case of the US, the most powerful econo-
my in the world, an expansion of trade on this scale meant removing restrictions 
on trade with Communist states and granting the USSR Most-Favored-Nation 
status.65 This, however, required approval from the US Congress, where strong 
opposition from anti-Communist and neo-conservative circles led by the influen-
tial democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson was certain.66  
Against the background of considerable economic and political uncertain-
ties, the United States initially remained reserved and, unlike their Soviet coun-
terparts, the US delegation did not push this issue during the Moscow Summit 
in May 1972.67 A year later, however, US President Nixon, in defense of his 
détente policy, seemed to have been much more inclined towards closer eco-
nomic cooperation with the USSR. In April 1973, two months before Brezh-
nev’s visit to the United States, Nixon, against the advice of people such as 
Charles DiBona, the President’s special consultant on energy,68 or Walter Levy, 
the renowned US oil analyst and consultant to the Department of State,69 urged 
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the members of his Cabinet to consider not only the economic merits, but the 
effect that the building of “that great pipeline that they are talking about” might 
have on “the total relationship with the Soviet Union.”70 At the same time, he 
wanted to present the gas deal as a means in his domestic struggle against opposi-
tion from Congress in order to say, “Look, we need them on gas and so forth.”71  
Despite continuous reservations due to economic feasibility, the US gov-
ernment thus showed willingness to support its energy companies, and it was 
thanks to the engagement of US Foreign Minister George Schultz that in June 
1973 a three-company US consortium signed a preliminary agreement with the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.72 A month later, Occidental Petroleum 
signed a five-year agreement with the Soviet government on natural gas, crude 
oil, agricultural chemicals, and other products.73 At the same time, negotiations 
with Japanese companies on research and development of Yakutian gas,74 
coal,75 and Sakhalin oil and gas76 were making progress, although not as fast as 
the Soviet government would have wanted.  
5.  The Oil Shock of 1973/74 
Against this background, the outbreak of open war in the Middle East in Octo-
ber 1973 could not have come at a worse moment, as Western-Soviet rap-
prochement was put to a severe test. As the center of international Communism 
and self-declared protector of Third World countries, the USSR could not but 
extend solidarity and support to its allies in the Arab world, both politically and 
in terms of arms transfers, if it did not want to lose its credibility. At the same 
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time, Moscow needed to proceed cautiously if it did not wish to seriously jeop-
ardize détente.  
When war broke out, Moscow officially sided with the Arabs and their 
“struggle for national liberation” and condemned Israeli “aggression.” But the 
Soviet Union showed restraint in attacking Western governments directly. 
Tellingly, information on the conflict never made headlines in the Soviet news-
paper Pravda, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party. The day after 
the outbreak of war, on October 7, 1973, Pravda reported on its front page at 
length on the visit of Japanese Premier Minister Tanaka to the Soviet Union 
and his talks with Soviet officials. Apart from a small note, all information on 
the conflict in the Near East was relegated to Pravda’s international section on 
page five.77 Already in early November 1973, when military operations in the 
Near East ended, the Soviet government had shown a readiness to resume 
diplomatic relations with Israel and to work towards a post-war settlement in 
the United Nations.78 
A similar situation arose when the Arab oil-producing states announced the 
intention to cut production on October 17, 1973. In general, the Soviet Union 
supported this decision, stressing the legitimate rights of the Arabs to fight 
imperialism, and Israeli aggression in particular, with their own means. In an 
Arabic broadcast on November 5, 1973, Radio Moscow noted the success of 
the Arab oil weapon, declaring that this weapon “is capable of hitting its target 
effectively over a distance much greater than any other weapon.”79 Although it 
was only to be expected that numerous observers in the West would see the 
Soviet Union as the instigator of the Arab oil embargo, the prospect of Western 
economies sliding into a serious recession was in fact hardly in Soviet interest, 
as this would have made it even more difficult for Moscow to get Western 
technical assistance and credits.80 In fact, as the scope of the crisis became 
apparent during November and December of 1973, Moscow’s initial feelings of 
triumph dissipated fairly quickly. Again, this became evident in the way the 
Soviet printing press presented the crisis.  
In an attempt to not unnecessarily strain relations with the West, Pravda put 
the blame not so much on Western government action against the Arabs, but on 
Western oil companies, which, due to higher oil prices, were reaping huge 
profits at the expense of the working classes. At the same time, Pravda started 
to report almost daily and in great detail, often illustrated by cartoons, on the 
economic crisis in the individual countries of the Western Europe and the 
Unites States, the severe economic hardship of the people, and social unrest.  
                                                             
77  Pravda 280 (October 7, 1973): 1, 5. 
78  Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1973, entry of November 4, 1973, 69.  
79  Cited from Oil Resources in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 408. 
80  Sowjet-Union: Hinter den Kulissen. 1973. Der Spiegel 50 (December 10): 96-7. 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  130 
Figure 1: “Milking:” Companies like Shell, Mobile, Texaco, and Total “take 
advantage of the energy crisis in line with their interests to reap 
super-profits” 
 
Source: Pravda 40 (February 9, 1974): 5. 
Figure 2: “Big business” Makes Profits from the Energy Crisis 
 
Source: Pravda 47 (February 16, 1974): 5.  
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It was in this context that Moscow thought it opportune to seize the moment in 
order to achieve its goal of closer economic cooperation. Instead of celebrating 
the West’s economic troubles, the Soviet Union launched a charm offensive in 
favor of joint cooperation projects on natural gas development in Siberia. In a 
discussion program for North America on November 4, 1973, Radio Moscow 
offered Soviet assistance to the West in overcoming the crisis and predicted the 
day when, thanks to Soviet-US cooperation, “cold Siberia will light and heat 
New York.”81 Two weeks later, on November 16, 1973, Radio Moscow in-
formed its listeners that “the energy crisis can be overcome” if the United 
States would open its market and remove discriminatory measures in trade with 
Socialist countries: “How can the US expect to cope with its economic and 
energy problems when it refuses countries rich in resources equal trade condi-
tions?”82 USSR representatives also used every available opportunity to intensi-
fy their efforts to strengthen economic cooperation. Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, in a speech during a United Nations conference on resource prob-
lems and economic development in April 1974, while again condemning Israeli 
aggression and demonstrating loyalty to the Arabs, offered the West long-term 
energy cooperation on the basis of Soviet oil and gas exports without “artificial 
barriers” in trade relations.83  
However, time was not on the side of the Soviet Union, especially regarding 
cooperation efforts with US companies. While, during the energy crisis of 
1973/74, the two sides did indeed come closer to reaching an agreement on the 
development of Siberian natural gas, US Congress, which was set against Nix-
on’s détente policy, dealt this endeavor a severe blow with the enactment of the 
Trade Act of 1974, signed into law in January 1975.84 The new Trade Act 
contained the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments. While the first 
amendment denied the Soviet Union Most-Favored-Nation status, the second 
prevented the granting of large loans or financial guarantees without final ap-
proval of Congress. As a reaction to this resolution, the USSR refused to put 
into force the trade agreement concluded with the United States in 1972.85  
Neither the “North Star” nor the Yakutia projects, which required very large 
credits, died immediately. US companies sought to realize “North Star” with 
partial European support and to implement the Yakutia project with a combina-
tion of US commercial bank credits and Japanese Export-Import bank credits. 
Nevertheless, by 1976, neither of the projects was pursued any further.86 The 
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shelving of these projects also meant that the plan to develop Siberian re-
sources was severely thwarted.  
6.  The Oil Crisis and the Comecon  
The global supply shortage caused by the Arab embargo and production cuts 
threatened not only to “embarrass” the Soviet Union’s standing as an oil sup-
plier to Western Europe, but also have an impact on Soviet behavior towards its 
Eastern European allies, the Socialist members of the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (commonly referred to as Comecon, or CMEA).  
Up until the early 1960s, Eastern Europe was still largely energy self-
sufficient, and the Soviet Union even imported modest quantities of energy 
from some of its Socialist neighbors. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
and Czechoslovakia, for example, held large reserves of lignite coal, while 
Poland had substantial reserves of hard coal. Only Romania, however, also 
disposed of significant reserves of liquid hydrocarbons and was an important 
oil producer. Largely due to the build-up of energy-intensive industries, such as 
the petrochemical industry, which the Soviet leadership started to actively 
promote under Khrushchev, Eastern Europe’s energy consumption grew at a 
quick pace.87 Consequently, the Comecon-countries soon became dependent on 
Soviet energy imports. From the mid-1960s onwards, the USSR transported 
large parts of its oil via the new “Friendship” oil pipeline (inaugurated in 1964 
and further enlarged during the 1970s). Starting in the late 1960s, Soviet gas 
reached Eastern Europe through the “Brotherhood” (bratstvo) pipeline, which 
opened in 1968 (with construction of additional sections during the 1970s).88 
To be sure, Eastern Europe also imported some of its oil from the Middle 
East,89 either directly or indirectly, via the Soviet Union, which bought mostly 
from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt.90 However, by 1970, an estimated 85 
percent of Eastern Europe’s oil requirement (exclusive of Romania) was cov-
ered by USSR production.91 Individual Comecon-countries, such as the GDR, 
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Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia, became dependent on Soviet supplies for more 
than 90 percent of their oil requirements.92 
The global energy crisis of 1973/74 aggravated Eastern Europe’s energy 
supply situation considerably. Already in late November 1973, Bulgaria, Po-
land, and Romania introduced measures to conserve fuel and power re-
sources.93 Even before the crisis, Poland, which imported all of its oil from the 
Soviet Union, started direct negotiations with Algeria, Iraq, and Iran on oil im-
ports; immediately after the Arab embargo, and in anticipation of potential cut-
backs of Soviet oil shipments, a Polish delegation held talks in Tripoli in order to 
look for additional energy sources.94 In fact, it was the USSR herself that encour-
aged its Eastern European allies to seek a larger share of their oil from other 
producers in the face of her own export bottlenecks.95  
While the USSR eventually managed to stabilize its oil exports to Western 
Europe following the crisis, it did so at the expense of its allies in Eastern Eu-
rope. According to estimations by a report of NATO’s Economic Committee, 
Moscow had cut back its oil exports to its Eastern European allies by more than 
a third by the mid-1970s.96 Moreover, the Comecon-countries experienced a 
sharp increase in prize for the oil they received from the Soviet Union – if the 
Eastern Europeans paid 30.3 rubles ($28.4) per ton of oil in 1973, they paid 
45.4 rubles ($60.4) in 1975.97  
Originally, prices for Soviet oil, which within the Comecon-area were based 
on payment in kind, had been generally lower than for oil traded on the interna-
tional market. Among Comecon-states, the prices had, since 1958, been agreed 
upon the basis of the average world market price for the last five years. While 
in 1970, the price for Soviet crude oil was still roughly equal to the world mar-
ket price, this gap started to widen as international prices increased starting in 
1970/71, and then surged after the oil shock of 1973/74. As a consequence, 
Comecon-countries in 1974 paid less than a third of the international market 
price for Soviet crude oil.98 Already in 1975, however, Moscow replaced the 
model of fixed prices with a new price regulation formula that took the average 
world market price of the preceding year as the basis.99  
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To be sure, maintaining and strengthening intra-bloc alliances would remain 
a top political priority for the Soviet party leadership. Even with the new price 
formula, Moscow would still negotiate prices and quantities with each Eastern 
European country individually, whereby political considerations always played a 
factor in these negotiations. But Soviet behavior in the mid-1970s also indicated 
that Moscow was less inclined to subsidize its Eastern European allies with cheap 
energy as larger economic considerations became increasingly important. Not 
only would Eastern Europe have to pay higher prices for Soviet oil in the years to 
come, but also intra-bloc energy trade, which used to be based exclusively on 
bartering, increasingly included cash as well, as Moscow demanded hard curren-
cy for oil shipments that exceeded initial supply agreements.100  
Faced with rising costs for imported Soviet oil, the Comecon-countries from 
the mid-1970s onwards advanced a series of alternative energy strategies.101 
The second half of the 1970s saw accelerated efforts to develop non-fossil 
energy sources within the individual countries, namely in the field of nuclear 
energy, but also the promotion of regional energy cooperation projects.102 
These included such large common infrastructure projects as the Orenburg gas 
pipeline (also called “Union”, or soiuz, pipeline), which was jointly built by 
workers from the GRD, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria during 
1975 and 1979 and transported Soviet gas from the Orenburg fields to Ukraine 
and Eastern Europe.103 The Comecon-countries also advanced other joint pipe-
line projects (e.g. the Adria oil pipeline) and sought to strengthen regional 
cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy research and development, and 
energy saving technology.104  
Although these measures impacted the region’s energy map, it was clear that 
Eastern Europe as a whole would continue to rely heavily on imports of Soviet 
oil and, increasingly, gas. If the Soviet Union thus wanted to meet the growing 
energy demand at home and fulfill contractual obligations towards its consum-
ers in both Western and Eastern Europe, the Moscow leadership had to take 
action. Therefore, the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s saw no alternative than to 
engage in the development of Western Siberian oil and gas sector on its own.  
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7.  The Siberian Campaign  
In April 1977, the CIA released two reports on Soviet energy prospects that 
would make headlines. The reports predicted that annual oil output would drop 
sharply due to declining production rates in the existing oil fields of the Volga-
Ural region and that, by the mid-1980s, the country would become a net im-
porter of oil. Moreover, in these and subsequent reports published during the 
same year, the CIA implied that in light of this situation, the USSR might seek 
to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf and enter into competition with the 
United States and other Western states for the struggle for oil.105 The Soviets 
naturally refuted the US forecast as “slander and falsification” and a typical 
method to “compromise the Soviet Socialist system of economy, to obstruct the 
further normalization of international relations, and to cast a shadow on the world 
aspirations of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,” as Radio Moscow put it to 
its listeners in an English broadcast to Asia on August 1, 1977.106 Although the 
CIA predictions on Soviet energy ultimately proved wrong, these reports drew 
heavily on official Soviet figures published in scientific journals, thus reflecting 
to a certain degree the current internal Soviet debate and fears of a looming ener-
gy crisis. In any case, it was probably no coincidence that it was precisely during 
this time that the campaign to develop Siberian energy gained speed.107 
The Soviet leadership had already launched its campaign to develop West-
ern Siberia on the occasion of the 25th Party Congress, which took place in 
February 1976. Unlike previous initiatives, this was to be done in a comprehen-
sive way, focusing not only on energy, but also on the development of a series 
of industrial and infrastructural complexes. This comprehensive development 
of Siberia was to receive similar priority in Soviet economic policy as the 
building of the Baikal-Amur Railway (Baikalo-Amurskaia-Magistral’ – BAM), 
which was not intended to be solely an infrastructure project to transport Sibe-
rian resources, but was also an element of the Soviet plan to develop and popu-
late the country’s East.108 It was only from about 1978 onwards, however, that 
Soviet mass propaganda started to publicly celebrate the development of Sibe-
ria as means of an overall attempt to mobilize society and gain momentum for 
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economic growth. Brezhnev himself was to become the driving force and per-
sonal promoter of these projects.  
During the months of March and April 1978, Brezhnev undertook a much-
publicized two-week journey through Siberia, visiting the biggest industrial and 
military cities and delivering speeches to workers, members of the party, youth 
organizations, and soldiers.109 This trip marked the beginning of a massive 
media campaign propagating the comprehensive industrial development of 
Siberia. The slogan “Siberian might” (Sibirskii razmakh) served as the headline 
of an article in Literaturnaia Gazeta on May 1, 1978, on the development 
Western Siberia, which was, according to the article, to encompass a total of 24 
individual projects, together forming a comprehensive “scientific program.”110 
Other newspapers, such as Pravda, followed suit by regularly publishing col-
umns reporting on Soviet achievements in Siberia.111  
Already in 1977, the Soviet government had nominated the Siberian branch 
of the Academy of Science to be the leading organization in charge of coordi-
nation and control of the different scientific organs involved in the complex 
development of Siberia, which ran under the program title “Siberia” (Sibir’).112 
The Siberian branch was responsible for the overall scientific approach on 
development problems, the implementation of scientific solutions in the indus-
trial branches and the education of specialized cadres. Siberia was to become 
the new “continent of discoveries” and was portrayed as a “future-oriented 
region” full of possibilities for innovative scientists and enthusiastic workers.113 
The campaign in the Soviet newspapers was accompanied by political posters 
with titles like “Give Siberia” or “Siberian might” calling for people to take 
part in this great Soviet endeavor.114 In an effort to attract work force, the Sibe-
rian “oilman” (neftianik) and “gasman” (gasovik) were elevated to heroic sta-
tus. Movies such as “Risk Strategy” (Strategiia riska; 1978) on the life of Far-
man Salmanov glorified Siberian workers, a myth cultivated further by 
numerous published memoirs.115  
The Siberian campaign was accompanied by renewed efforts on the part of 
Brezhnev to activate foreign economic relations. In May 1978 he visited West 
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Germany for the second time. The Soviet leader knew that the situation within 
the USSR was going from bad to worse. In letters addressed to the party and 
the people, Brezhnev complained quite frankly on economical ineffectiveness, 
unmotivated workers, problems in several industrial sectors, including the slow 
development of Western Siberian oil and gas.116 The USSR urgently needed to 
expand trade if only to stock up its foreign currency reserves in order to contin-
ue to be able to buy sufficient grain. In 1978, the USSR was once more com-
pelled to import 15 million tons of grain from the United States due to yet 
another bad harvest. Brezhnev thus urged for the conclusion of new economic 
deals.117 However, it was yet another major event on the global oil market, the 
Iranian crisis of 1979, that provided the impetus for the USSR and Western 
Europe to finally engage in those discussions which would very shortly result 
in the building of a pipeline directly connecting the gas fields of northern Tiu-
men’ with the West European market. 
8.  The Breakthrough: Building the “biggest pipeline of 
the world” 
In order to free more oil and gas for export, the Soviet Union had never re-
stricted itself to considering only the development of Siberia, but had been 
working since the late 1960s to build up relations with Iran and Afghanistan in 
order to import energy in exchange for technology and assistance. Iran had 
been a key exporter of oil on the global market. Although the country also held 
huge gas reserves, the industry was still underdeveloped. The Soviet Union was 
the only country importing gas from Iran. Going back to an arrangement con-
cluded already in 1966, Iran shipped gas to the Soviet Union via the so-called 
Iran Gas Trunkline (IGAT I), completed in October 1970.118  
It was after the oil shock of 1973/74, especially, that Europe became in-
creasingly interested in Iranian gas as well. In light of their dependency on 
Arab oil, the Europeans were not only looking for alternative oil providers, but 
also sought to reduce the share of oil in their energy mix altogether. Gas was 
considered to be a perfect substitute for oil, and the Europeans thus increased 
their search for new gas import options. Next to Dutch, Libyan, Algerian, Sovi-
et, and later Norwegian gas, Iran, with its massive yet still largely untapped gas 
reserves, was considered to be a most welcome alternative. Basically, three 
import options were discussed at the time: Europe could seek to access Iranian 
gas via the building of pipeline through Turkey, it could buy it in the form of 
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LNG directly from Iran, or it could attempt to conclude a deal including the 
Soviet Union.  
The third option was the most appealing, as the Europeans would be able to 
draw on existing pipeline infrastructure with the possibility to expand these in 
the future. Any agreement of this sort implied transit of Iranian gas through the 
Soviet Union, whereby the most feasible option was a “switch arrangement” – 
that is, the Soviet Union would have to agree to deliver the same amount of gas 
it imported from Iran to the European partners from its own deposits. On the 
West European side, the German company Ruhrgas was the principal negotia-
tor on behalf of a larger consortium that included several European energy 
companies. After a series of long and complicated negotiations, a basic agree-
ment on a “switch deal” between Iran, the USSR, and Ruhrgas was reached in 
April 1975, and negotiations continued into the following years.119 
In early 1979, however, this whole endeavor came to an abrupt halt with the 
Iranian revolution, when the new Iranian government pulled out of the deal and 
stopped gas shipments to the Soviet Union altogether. If the Soviet Union was 
to adhere to the agreement with the Europeans, however, it had to look for 
ways to replace the shortfall of Iranian gas – and it was at this point precisely 
that the idea of building a pipeline directly connecting Western Siberian gas 
with the European market gained momentum. Discussions between German 
and Soviet trade representatives on building a direct transportation link had 
been going on since the early 1977.120 It was only after the Iranian crisis, 
though, that such an option, after initial secret negotiations, was discussed in 
the highest circles of political power. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin took the 
chance to promote the pipeline project during the German-Soviet meeting in 
Moscow in July 1980. Kosygin made it plain and clear to German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt that the “geological and technical problems” were enormous, 
but given the immense reserves of natural gas, the pipeline project would in 
any case not be subject to short-term cyclical moods: “[Such a pipeline] would 
be operational for 30 to 35 years. This is how long the stocks last. It is going to 
be the biggest pipeline of the world.”121  
Neither the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the Polish 
uprising in 1981, nor the sanctions imposed by the United States in 1982 on the 
shipment of steel pipes and pipeline technology to the Soviet Union prevented 
the Europeans from going along with Moscow in their common efforts to real-
ize what was to become the largest economic deal in the history of East-West 
relations during the Cold War. In late 1983, the pipeline under the name 
“Yamal” (the Urengoi-to-Uzhgorod pipeline) was inaugurated. It was capable 
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of transporting an additional 40 billion cubic meters of Soviet gas annually 
from the gigantic field of Urengoi over a length of 4500 km up to Uzhgorod on 
the Ukrainian border, and from there on to West Germany.122 Thus, with a 
delay of about ten years, the Soviet Union, assisted by technology and credits 
from the West, was finally able to realize the projects that the political leader-
ship had been actively promoting since the early 1970s.  
To be sure, the “Yamal” export pipeline was only one of six pipelines that 
were built in the first half of the 1980s, and which would also radically shift the 
geography of the Soviet Union’s internal gas structure.123 The development of 
Western Siberian gas marked the beginning of the “gasification” of the Soviet 
economy. From 1981 to 1985, the overall share of gas in the Soviet Union’s 
energy production rose from 28.4 to 35.5 percent124 and would continue to rise 
in the years to follow, making gas the single most important source in the ener-
gy mix of the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation).125  
Thus, at the time, the development of Western Siberia looked like the salva-
tion for all of the Soviet Union’s economic troubles. Through an expansion of 
its energy base, Moscow was able to export additional oil and gas to Western 
Europe and buy Western consumer goods, high-tech, and grain in return. The 
Soviet Union was also in a position to meet the energy needs of its Eastern 
European allies and finance such costly enterprises as the arms race or the war 
in Afghanistan. All this, however, was possible as long as prices for energy 
remained high. When prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership 
was left with no choice but to tackle those unpopular reforms it so desperately 
sought to avoid in the past.  
Ultimately, the growth in energy trade and foreign currency earnings did not 
save the Soviet Union from collapse. The Soviet crisis was systemic, and the 
remedies offered during Brezhnev’s long reign were cosmetic. Brezhnev died 
on November 10, 1982 and would thus not live to see the opening of the 
“Yamal” pipeline. At least, however, Brezhnev’s vision of connecting East and 
West via a big pipeline held what it promised, as it is via this same channel that 
a substantial part of Russian gas continues to flow to Europe. 
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9.  Politics and Energy during the Cold War 
Although the expansion of East-West trade during the 1970s and early 1980s 
was driven namely by economic considerations, the trajectories leading to 
energy interdependence between several Western European states and the 
Soviet Union cannot be disentangled from the broader dynamics within the 
international setting of the Cold War, the specific perceptions and political 
visions regarding East-West relations, and events in the global energy market.  
In the case of Western Europe, German Ostpolitik, the idea of improving po-
litical relations through means of trade, was an important element facilitating 
closer economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe, starting already in 
the late 1960s and continuing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, trade 
between Eastern and Western European countries was also something that 
many considered to be natural, given geographic proximity and historical tradi-
tions. Furthermore, due to Western Europe’s poverty in oil and gas reserves, 
trade in energy was simply seen as a pragmatic undertaking that served inter-
ests on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  
The rationale behind establishing US-USSR economic relations was slightly 
different. US energy companies may have had a genuine commercial interest in 
cooperating with the Soviet Union on gas, and the United States as a whole 
would have certainly profited from additional fossil fuel suppliers, especially 
when the country had to import more and more energy during the 1970s from 
the instable Arab world in order to meet rising domestic demand. Still, it was 
very clear that the United States was less interested in cooperation than the 
Soviet Union not only for economic reasons, but also because Washington 
never attached the same political meaning to an economic partnership. The 
USSR, on the other hand, was very keen on establishing cooperation based on 
economic deliberations, and Moscow was equally interested in the political 
benefits that such trade would bring.  
The United States never seemed to fully appreciate that Brezhnev’s vision of 
building “long-lasting peace” was not a hollow rhetoric formula or mere tactics 
to enlarge global Soviet power, but a program in which the Soviet leader actu-
ally believed. The two superpowers had, according to Brezhnev, a global re-
sponsibility to avoid another war, and thus their cooperation needed to be ce-
mented not only through bilateral summit talks and arms reduction agreements, 
but also through trade expansion. Soviet behavior during the Yom Kippur War 
and the subsequent energy crisis brought about by the Arab oil embargo in 
1973/74 are cases in point. In order to not endanger détente, Moscow not only 
showed restraint during the October War (although, due to the Soviet Union’s 
continued support of the Arabs, including the shipment of arms, Washington 
remained highly suspicious of Soviet intensions), but also sought to seize the 
subsequent energy crisis in the West as a window of opportunity to expand 
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energy relations. In Brezhnev’s view, this was the best way to tie the two su-
perpowers together in a mutually advantageous long-term relationship.  
The decision of the US Congress to put a stop to these endeavors came as a 
shock to Brezhnev. Brezhnev’s illness, which started sometime in 1974, seri-
ously impeded him from playing the same active role in politics as previous-
ly,126 and it may even be that Brezhnev’s passivity was a major reason for the 
delay of Western Siberian development during much of 1974-1977. It was not 
until 1978 that Brezhnev was back on the scene, resuming his travels and prop-
agating the development of Siberia with renewed vigor. In fact, it was only 
then that the Siberian campaign really took off, and it was only after this point 
that the Soviet Union was able to substantially increase oil export volumes to 
the West, which had been stagnating for the previous four years. As oil prices 
increased again during the Iranian crisis, the influx of hard currency was great-
er than ever.127  
However, with the decline of détente and the dissolution of US-Japanese-
USSR plans to develop Siberian gas by the mid-1970s, it was the Iranian crisis 
that finally provided the breakthrough in the European-USSR energy relation-
ship. Looking back during his final visit to West Germany in 1982, Brezhnev 
deplored that so much time had been wasted in expanding East-Western energy 
relations.128 This time, though, the deal was sealed, and not even US sanctions 
were able to thwart this project, as Western Europe decided to defy US policy.  
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